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Abstract: 
 
This paper considers the history of governance and speculation on US derivative markets from their 
emergence in the middle of the 19th century through their incursion into finance in the late 20th 
century. It explores the importance of derivatives’ extended ancestry in agricultural markets before 
analyzing their entanglement with financial markets, which came much later in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The paper is particularly concerned with the institutional inheritance of a set of legal–regulatory 
boundaries that prioritized price making and the speculative trading that was necessary to produce a 
consistent flow of prices. This governance system for derivatives is set in contrast with the 
governance of securities markets, which during the 1930s became subject to more strict government 
oversight, particularly with regard to speculative trading. The legal boundaries between these two 
markets began to deteriorate in the 1970s when the Chicago derivative exchanges applied the 
speculative logic of agricultural derivative markets to financial instruments. The implications of this 
are twofold. First the paper argues that market mechanisms and market regulation are analytically 
inseparable, and ought to be studied as such. Second, employing this approach, the paper argues that 
US financial derivative markets are originally ‘derivative’ not of New York and the finance sector, 
but of Chicago and the agricultural sector. 
 
Keywords: Chicago, markets, futures, derivatives, finance, regulation, legal geography, Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The critical legal scholar, Lynn Stout, argues that the 2008 financial crisis was “caused, first 
and foremost, by changes in the law” (2011: 3), suggesting that “all significant markets, including 
financial markets, must be built on some underlying legal infrastructure” (37).  Stout’s underlying 
argument is one I believe critical social scientists ought to take more seriously: the law and other 
“rule regimes” (Brenner, et al. 2010) are fundamentally constitutive of both markets and market 
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failures.  In geography, the scholarship on regulation is largely written by scholars interested in the 
neoliberal state, and it tends to assume an operational separation of markets from regulation. 
Furthermore, the sub-filed of legal geography, while expanding in scope (Delaney 2014), has mostly 
ignored markets and market regulation.  I argue that a close analysis of market “legalities” (Pollard 
and Samers 2013) demonstrates that in effect markets and regulations are often one and the same.  As such, 
this article attempts to articulate a “geography of marketization” (Boeckler and Berndt 2012) by 
focusing on the legal-regulatory structures that “define” markets (Christophers forthcoming).  
Interrogating the constitutive relationship between markets and legal-regulatory structures is 
particularly important in light of recent work on the historical evolution and contradictions of 
(neo)liberal philosophy with regard to markets (Peck 2010, Harcourt 2011, Dardot and Laval 2013).  
It is increasingly clear that our current market society is in part the result of a long history of 
intellectual work that has framed the active construction and maintenance—or regulation—of 
market mechanisms by the state as outside the sphere of legitimate political contestation.  This 
article contributes to the project of correcting that flawed perspective. 
Law and regulation have been particularly important to the development of financial 
derivative markets.  Originally designed in Chicago in the late 19th Century to coordinate 
geographically dispersed agricultural markets, in the late 20th Century the same legal and regulatory 
infrastructure became a constitutive element in the construction of a highly speculative U.S. financial 
market system.  In agricultural commerce, law and government regulation were often explicitly 
employed to produce an “efficient” price mechanism, and in that regard speculation was accepted as a 
necessary evil, if not encouraged as virtuous.  On the other hand, during the 1930s the U.S. 
government took a relatively adversarial stance towards the financial sector, particularly towards 
speculative trading.  In this way, the market logics of agricultural commerce, and the governance 
structures that those logics depended upon were bounded off from finance.  In the 1970s, however, 
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financial derivatives, or “futures” as they were then called, emerged not from the New York based 
financial sector, but from the Chicago-based agricultural sector.  Although the commodities traded 
in this new market were financial, the market rules and thus the market structures were inherited 
directly from the distinctly speculative agricultural markets.  As a result the boundary between these 
two market systems—a boundary that helped keep speculative finance in check—was fractured.   
 By analyzing the events that led to the collapse of this boundary, this article contributes to 
an “extended historical genealogy” (Christophers 2014a: 286) of the emergence of U.S. financial 
derivative markets as well as the 2008 financial collapse.  In other words, I aim to help untangle the 
“pre-history” (Peck 2010) of the intense financial “deregulation” and neoliberal political maneuvers 
of the 1980s and 1990s as well as the massive, derivative-fueled speculative bubble of the mid-2000s.  
I trace this history by focusing on the key regulatory changes mandated by the courts and the U.S. 
Congress and enacted through government agencies, and privately through the U.S. derivatives 
exchanges and markets.   
This article draws on a larger study investigating the relationship between the economic 
geography of Chicago and the emergence of financial derivatives as well as the uniquely speculative 
nature of those instruments, and how their emergence transformed the U.S. financial sector and 
contributed to the emergence of a crisis-prone financialzed economy (see Muellerleile 2013).  The 
methods employed in the larger project included 30 in depth interviews with actors involved in the 
development of these instruments including traders, exchange executives, derivatives lawyers, and 
federal regulators.  I also conducted an archival and textual analysis of newspapers, trade magazines, 
and corporate and government reports.  
 Others have discussed the history of Chicago’s derivative markets (cf. Tamarkin 1993, 
Melamed 1996, Falloon 1998, Rodengen 2008), but much of this history is uncritical, if not 
celebratory.  The construction of these markets is impressive, and I have made use of this history, 
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but I am interested in placing these markets in historical, geographic, and political-economic context, 
something much of this history fails to accomplish.  My analysis does however build on a solid base 
of scholarly work on Chicago’s derivatives exchanges.  Most notably my work draws on William 
Cronon’s (1991) analysis of Chicago’s 19th Century role in the development of agricultural markets, 
Ann Fabian’s (1999) analysis of the demonization of bucket shop gambling by the Chicago 
exchanges, Caitlin Zaloom’s (2006) ethnographic study of Chicago pit traders, and Yuval Millo’s 
(2003) analysis of the socio-technical networks of traders, regulators, and economists that 
constituted the first equity option markets (see also MacKenzie 2006).  My analysis is unique from 
these in two main ways.  First and most importantly, it comes after the 2008 crisis, which begs us to 
reconsider the political-economy of derivatives, particularly the importance of their speculative and 
price-making characteristics, both of which contributed—in their unravelling—to the crisis.  Second, 
I privilege the geographic institutedness of the Chicago markets and their regulatory structures as a 
key variable in the development of a uniquely spatialized legal-regulatory-market regime. 
2. Market and Regulation—an inseparable pair 
 One of Philip Mirowski’s (2013) main arguments in his recent extended screed against the 
neoliberal thought collective is that regulation has been misunderstood by both the political right 
and left.  Particularly on the left, what he calls “team regulation” (pg. 16) has relied on the argument 
that de-regulation is to blame for the 2008 crisis, and what is needed is for the state to re-regulate 
financial markets the way it did during the golden years of Fordism.  Relying on this “dichotomy 
between markets and governmentality” (ibid: 16), however, masks the ways in which neoliberal 
governance employs state power to construct markets (Dardot and Laval 2013), something Jamie 
Peck and other critics of neoliberalism have been pointing out for years (Peck 2010).   
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The imagined autonomy of regulation is not just an idiosyncrasy of neoliberal governance, 
however.  The law, which is one of the main components of market regulation, has for centuries 
acquired its power and legitimacy by distinguishing itself from politics and economics (Barkan 2011).  
This dichotomy perpetuates the myth that a “free market” can exist if some market essence could 
only be released from its bane: regulation.  In practice, no price mechanism can exist without rules, 
laws, boundaries and borders (Harcourt 2011).  Consequently, the task at hand is not to imagine the 
extent to which any given market is free, but how any given market is “regulated”. 
Despite economic geographers broad engagement with the state and state governance of 
economic activity (for a recent review see MacKinnon 2012), there is no coherent geographic 
literature on market regulation, per se.  Regulation theory or the “regulation approach” (Jessop and 
Sum 2006) might be the one obvious framework to turn to, particularly because it emphasizes the 
extra-economic (i.e. political, social, institutional) constitution of the economic system.  The 
regulation approach, however, is broadly concerned with the systemic regulation of capitalist 
accumulation, particularly regimes or temporary periods of accumulation (Jessop and Sum 2006), 
which makes it a bit of a “blunt” methodological instrument (see Peck and Tickell 2012).  This is 
particularly true for analysis of what Clark (1992) called “real regulation”, or in other words, specific 
markets and their regulatory institutions (see Jessop and Sum 2006: 222).  Nevertheless, the 
regulation approach broadly informs the arguments in this article, particularly in relation to my 
concern with the recent development of a highly speculative and crisis-prone financialized regime of 
accumulation. 
One way to analyze market regulation at a more granular level is to examine how the law and 
legal institutions, or what Pollard and Samers (2013) call “legalities”, are entangled with market 
structures and price mechanisms. Geographers have argued that the law is by its very nature a spatial 
and material phenomenon often implicated in the construction of political and geographic 
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boundaries (Blandy and Sibley 2010, Barkan 2011), but they have rarely considered markets as part 
of this legal-spatial nexus.  David Delaney (2014) has recently reviewed the “legal constitutivity” of 
various institutions, but markets are barely part of the story.  Brett Christophers has, however, 
created an opening with two recent articles considering the importance of competition law to market 
constitution (2014b; forthcoming).  He argues that the law is crucial to the process of “market 
definition” or the “drawing” of necessary boundaries around particular markets to define 
commodities and limit competition.  In this way the law is less important as an object of state 
sovereignty and power, and more important as a constitutive and material “device” for market 
construction.  Riles (2011) provides another glimpse of what this sort of work might look like in her 
analysis of the emergence of “global private law” which is used by international financial traders to 
manage their derivative trades which largely exist outside of the sphere of influence of any nation-
state government.  For Riles, it is the mundane and technical practices of the operation of the 
market (e.g. ticking boxes on paper forms), not a state or a sovereign, which constitute the 
regulatory law and thus the space of the global swaps market. 
Considering regulatory legalities (boundaries) this way—as a technical practice or procedure, or 
as a performance of knowledge—largely decontextualized from state power, makes it easy to 
imagine the mobility of those legalities since they are theorized as relatively disentangled from socio-
territorial context.  There is not room here to properly engage the intersection of my arguments with 
the policy mobility literature (see Peck 2011), but by theorizing regulatory legalities as an integral and 
necessary part of markets as opposed to separate and outside of markets, we ought to be able to 
study the mobility of market mechanisms by studying the mobility of market regulation. 
The challenge with imagining regulation as something technical and mobile, or as a system of 
knowledge, is that the approach tends to silence the historic and geographic entanglements of laws 
and regulations, particularly as they are embedded in institutions and places (Clark 1992, Pollard and 
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Samers 2013, Muellerleile 2013).  It furthermore risks reinvigorating the argument that law is 
autonomous from political and economic context.  This is of particular concern in the matter of 
financial regulation where the laws and legal-regulatory institutions have layered and path-dependent 
histories that matter for understanding markets in the present (Konings 2011).  In other words, 
regardless of new technologies or path creating innovations in finance, geographic origins and path 
dependencies of market regulatory institutions influence how they play out in the contemporary 
economic environment.  Government regulatory agencies in particular are products of “inherited 
institutional landscapes” (Brenner, et al. 2010: 184), many of them in the U.S. going back 80 or more 
years.  One of the reasons this history must be unearthed is that many of the boundaries around and 
between financial markets, despite their oft-perceived naturalness, are products of a highly 
contingent political history.  Reframing the financial system in this light is one necessary step in the 
larger project of “re-politicizing” (DeGoede 2005) the power of financial markets. 
 
3. The Geography of Grain Prices 
The legal boundaries around financial derivatives markets can only be properly understood 
in light of their historical entanglement with U.S. grain commerce, which has been centered in 
Chicago since the 1850s.  And yet, prior to the 1970s, the trading of derivatives in the U.S. was quite 
distinct from trading in the financial sector.  The trading of derivatives or what were called 
“futures”, was embedded in the trading of “commodities” or bulk agricultural goods, the most 
common of which were grains1.   
The production of grain commodities has always—and still is—dispersed over a vast 
landscape, and is unique to local soils and climates.  But through the second half of the 19th Century 
                                                 
1 A futures contract is an agreement to exchange a certain quantity and quality of a commodity at a set price, 
date and location.  For thorough and authoritative overview of futures contracts see Hieronomys (1977); for a 
fascinating account of how they relate to 19th Century Chicago see Cronon (1991). 
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a sophisticated network or railroads and telegraphs emerged in the U.S. that centralized the pricing of 
grains in Chicago (Carey 1989).  The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) played an important role in 
this process by creating rules that standardized both the classification and trading of grain (Cronon 
1991).  As a result of this early regulatory work, the CBOT was the first institution to develop a 
highly liquid market in futures contracts for grain.   
Futures contracts were not historically unique to Chicago, but the volume of grain flowing 
through Chicago made that city’s futures more consequential than ever before.  Because of 
Chicago’s connectedness with the rest of the continent, the prices “produced” as a result of CBOT 
futures trading became a standard reference point for the dispersed production and exchange of 
grain across the U.S. including on smaller futures exchanges (Federal Trade Commission (hereafter 
FTC) 1920).  In effect the Chicago futures markets created a new relational economic geography not 
only as a node in the network of the material transportation and exchange of grain, but also through 
the less tangible transmission of grain prices first through word of mouth and newspapers, and later 
electronic telegraph signals.   
Despite farmers’ frustration that the fruits of their labor were priced hundreds of miles away 
in Chicago, these prices became crucial information for farmers, grain elevators and processors, and 
grain traders.  Furthermore, as grain commerce became more integrated with circuits of credit and 
capital (see Henderson 1999), and more dependent upon risk management tools such as futures 
contracts, the flow of price information became a necessary prerequisite for cash crop farming (FTC 
1920).  As a result, the smooth operation of the price mechanism itself became a measurement of the health 
of commerce in grains (Lurie 1979), something that would be declared to be in “in the national 
interest” by the U.S. Congress in 1922 (Grain Futures Act 1922).   
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The leaders of the CBOT realized that their futures prices were important to the commerce 
in grain, and they worked to establish rules and standards to prevent disruptions in the supply of 
grain (Cronon 1991) and thus their steady production of prices (Fabian 1999).  They also established 
internal exchange rules to facilitate the smooth operation of the price mechanism (Lurie 1979), 
which was occasionally subject to deliberate manipulations by speculators.  But the CBOT was also 
an association of traders—people who made their livelihoods by trading on price movements.  
Speculative or “local” traders served the vital function of providing the market liquidity necessary to 
ensure that grain hedgers2 could move in and out of the futures market without significantly 
impacting prices.  Thus the CBOT vigorously defended speculation, particularly against those who 
sought to impose outside rules and regulations on their markets. 
Speculation was, however, a controversial category of economic activity in the late 19th and 
early 20th Century.  The reasons for this are complicated, and a detailed discussion is out of the 
scope of this article (see Fabian 1999, Stout 1999).  But, generally speaking, speculation was assumed 
to divert capital from productive investment, distort prices, and morally corrupt both the speculator 
and society.  Reflecting this, common law has generally prohibited purely speculative exchanges and 
markets.  At a minimum, common law required potential speculators to incur the costs of 
transportation and storage of the goods speculated upon (Stout 1999: 712-721), which incentivized 
investment in actual commerce.  Since the end of the 19th Century, however, there was an exception 
for trading on organized exchanges, where delivery of the commodity is at a minimum 
“contemplated” (Levy 2006) and the participants were subject to institutionalized trading rules 
                                                 
2 Hedgers are those using futures as insurance against undesirable changes in price that might otherwise 
threaten their material stake in the underlying commerce. 
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(Stout 1999).3  In other words, the speculative market was only allowed to operate because it was 
bounded. 
Nevertheless, the bias against speculation was particularly problematic for the CBOT.  Even 
though an actual exchange of grain was immanent in every futures contract, the vast majority of the 
CBOT trades never resulted in an exchange because they were offset by opposite contracts prior to 
their expiration (FTC 1920).  For this reason, the CBOT was regularly accused of being little more 
than a gambling hall.  Making matters worse for the CBOT, informal gambling parlors or 
“bucketshops” began to pop up all over Chicago as well as across the rural landscape anywhere 
there was regular access to price quotations from Chicago.  In a bucketshop anyone could place a 
bet on the changing price of grain futures, but they were notorious for disappearing overnight when 
too many bets went against the house (Fabian 1999, DeGoede 2005).   
For the CBOT, bucketshops were a double threat.  First, they lured away speculative dollars 
that might otherwise be spent in the formal futures market.  Second, and more importantly, 
bucketshop “trades” were pure wagers with no possibility of a connection to actual commerce or 
the production of grain prices.  As such, they drew undesirable comparisons to CBOT trading where 
95% or more of grain futures contracts were offset by opposite trades prior to expiration 
(Hieronymus 1977).  Consequently, the CBOT struggled to manage the contradiction between 
maintaining its image as a legitimate and virtuous economic institution, but at the same time leave 
space for its members to profit from speculation.  In part it tried to accomplish this by demonizing 
                                                 
 
3 One further exception is important.  Securities markets such as the New York Stock Exchange do require a 
speculator to take delivery of the good, but that good is typically little more than a piece of paper such as a 
stock certificate (or in the 21st Century, an electronic representation).  The costs of holding such an inventory 
are low, which made securities markets ripe for speculation.  This is exactly why, Stout (1999) argues, 
securities exchanges have high margin or collateral requirements and other rules designed to limit speculation 
(see below.) 
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and outlawing bucketshop gambling, which it struggled to frame as outside the boundaries of 
virtuous and rational commercial enterprise (Lurie 1979, Fabian 1999).   
As both Jonathan Lurie (1979) and Ann Fabian (1999) point out, the CBOT attempted to 
establish a boundary around its trading by formalizing and rationalizing its operations to create the 
image of a formal, ordered, and rational institution.  The CBOT formalized its rules and committee 
structure forcing its members to only trade at certain times so as to encourage the production of 
consistent prices, agree to arbitration in the case of disputes, and allow for fines and even expulsion 
from membership for breaking the rules.  No doubt, what some might call a paradigmatic example 
of a free market was significantly framed by rules and regulations—they just happened to be 
controlled by the market itself as opposed to the state (Harcourt 2011). 
When grain prices collapsed after World War I, however, CBOT speculators were blamed, 
and pressure from farmers was too much for even the politically powerful CBOT to resist.  In 1922 
the U.S. Congress enacted the first federal regulation of grain trading by passing the Grain Futures 
Act (1922).  The farm lobby and their allies in Congress pushed for a total ban on futures trading, 
referring to speculators as “predatory parasites” (Romano 1997: 279), and to the CBOT as a 
“gambling hell” (Fabian 1999). On the other hand, the CBOT and other opponents of government 
regulation argued that speculative trading was a crucial component of grain commerce.  Citing a 
recent study of the grain trade by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC 1920), they argued that 
speculation provided the liquid market that was necessary for commercial hedgers, as well as a 
constant flow of price information that improved the efficiency of commerce (see Romano 1997). 
In the end, despite the rhetoric of many Members of Congress arguing that the legislation 
would limit the influence of market forces, particularly speculative price making, the Grain Futures 
Act had an almost opposite effect.  Rather it was to control factors that would prevent the market 
mechanism from operating efficiently and producing accurate and consistent prices.  The federal 
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government mandated that grain futures could only be traded on federally licensed “contract 
exchanges”, thus defining the market and limiting competition (see Christophers forthcoming 1&2).  
While this did not completely eliminate bucketshop activities, it funneled speculative trading onto 
the CBOT.  The added legitimacy of being federally licensed meant that the CBOT, despite being 
highly dependent on speculation, became the institutionalized, productive, and rational other to 
informal, unproductive, and irrational gambling (Fabian 1999). 
 Between 1922 and 1936, very little changed in federal regulation of grain exchanges, but this 
cannot be said for the political economic environment.  The stock market crash, widespread bank 
failures, the Great Depression, The Dust Bowl, and the New Deal radically changed the context in 
which the federal government might intervene in the economy.  In 1936 the Grain Futures Act was 
replaced by the Commodity Exchange Act, but despite the Keynesian ferment and legal realism that 
drove much of the New Deal, commodities/futures exchanges were again not significantly impacted 
(Markham 1987, Romano 1997).  Congress created a new federal agency, the Commodity Exchange 
Authority (CEA), housed in the Agriculture Department, to take over responsibility for monitoring 
commodity exchanges.  The CEA was given a number of new mandates to monitor speculation, but 
they rarely took any action, choosing instead to let the market sort it out (Markham 1987).  Crucially, 
despite strong arguments otherwise, the commodity exchanges successfully argued in 1936 as they 
had for 50 years that speculation was in the economic and public benefit, and as such they were left 
to control their own collateral requirements.  
 
4. Securities and Lawyers 
The story of the federal regulation of speculation on securities markets stands in contrast to 
agricultural futures markets.  In the shadow of the 1929 stock market crash, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
minced no words as he campaigned for U.S. President in 1932 accusing the Hoover administration 
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of “lining up with the stock market”4 repeatedly disparaging speculation and “paper profits”.  In 
1933 Roosevelt’s nascent administration immediately began work on new banking, investment 
banking, and securities regulations.  Against the loud protest of Wall Street bankers, two bills were 
passed to regulate the securities industry: the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act (hereafter “1933/1934 Acts”).  Together the two acts created a new independent agency, the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), to supervise implementation and enforce rules over the 
issuance of new securities, as well as the authority to review and approve the operating rules of 
securities or stock exchanges.  Most importantly, it gave the Federal Reserve the power to control 
collateral levels on stock exchanges with the specific intention to diminish opportunities for 
speculation with borrowed money (Seligman 2003, Stout 1999). 
The 1933/1934 Acts and more importantly the SEC as a nascent institution stand in contrast 
with the federal commodity/futures legalities.  First, the top priority of the SEC became protecting 
the public from fraud, and fraudulent securities, not producing efficient price mechanisms.  For the 
most part this was accomplished not by mandating changes in the way securities were traded, but in 
how securities were issued and marketed to the public.  All public companies were compelled to 
follow standardized accounting procedures as well as required to produce standardized annual 
reports including basic financial information.  This reflected the guiding principal of the SEC—
disclosure and transparency would protect the investing public, and in turn produce competitive 
markets (Khademian 1992). 
Second, the SEC took from the 1933/34 Acts a direct interest in preventing excessive 
speculation on stock markets (Stout 1999, Thel 1990).  There was widespread consensus at the time 
that excessive speculation caused the stock market bubble in 1927-29, the crash in Oct. 1929, and 
                                                 
4 FDR Campaign Address at Columbus, Ohio, August 20, 1932, accessed online here on 9-15-13: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=88407 
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the ensuing financial and economic collapse (Federal Reserve 1984).  Unchecked speculation was 
therefore assumed to lead not just to personal or institutional bankruptcy, but to macro-economic 
trauma.  For this reason FDR pushed legislation that installed collateral or “margin” limits high 
enough to curtail speculation on the stock exchanges (Seligman 2003: 76). Underlying this was a 
different philosophy from that of the rules governing commodities/futures.  In 1984 the Federal 
Reserve explained the difference between securities and commodities/futures margins: 
The differences in margin ratios appear traceable in part to the disparate history of federal 
regulation and in part to the nature of the markets.  The futures exchanges, free of federal 
regulation, have established their margin ratios to achieve but one objective: to protect 
individual brokers and thus assure the integrity of the marketplace.  The initial margin ratios 
in securities and options markets, on the other hand, are in place to achieve the public policy 
objectives reviewed above, and protection of market integrity is seen as a beneficial by-product of these 
other objectives (Federal Reserve 1984: 16, emphasis added). 
 
Third, although the agency did not infringe much on the day to day operation of the New York 
Stock Exchange, the SEC was granted wide leeway to establish and maintain the emerging federal 
securities laws as it related to securities issuance, investment banking, and corporate governance.  
From the outset, the agency accomplished this by employing mostly lawyers.  As many have argued 
(cf. Khademian 1992) a prosecutorial culture and combatant attitude toward “the street” emerged at 
the SEC.  This was connected to a deep commitment to the principals of customer protection.  To 
the extent that the SEC was concerned with efficient markets and efficient distribution of capital, 
which it was, these concerns were translated through the SEC’s top priority: employing the law to 
ensure a transparent investment environment for the public.  
From the establishment of the SEC, it was an agency that the Chicago futures exchanges wanted 
to keep at arm’s length.  It was a principal of the commodities/futures business that producing 
prices was the basis of their enterprise, and this depended on the kind of speculation that the SEC 
and the common law tradition were fundamentally suspicious of.  Fortunately for the Chicagoans 
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there was a clear legal boundary between securities and commodities trading, but it would not last 
forever.   
 
5.  The Limits of the Agricultural Commodity 
One must skip forward 30 to 40 years to identify the contemporary implications of these 
boundaries around speculation.  In the early and mid-1970s the Chicago exchanges began to apply 
their institutional expertise in agricultural futures to financial instruments that were produced not 
across the vast U.S. rural landscapes, but in dense urban spaces, particularly New York.  Seeing this, 
the federal government, not having made any major regulatory innovations with regard to 
commodities/futures speculation since 1936, played a key role (Millo 2003) in what would over the 
next 20 years become a revolution in finance.   
In 1970, the business of futures was still deeply embedded in agricultural exchange.  While 
there were small, decentralized inter-firm markets for foreign currencies and stock options in New 
York, there were no centralized or standardized markets or price mechanisms for futures or options 
on financial instruments.  In the sphere of government regulation of centralized exchanges, there 
was a clear division of labor between what was considered the securities industry and the 
commodities/futures industry.  The SEC was responsible for the securities industry that was 
centered in New York.  The CEA, under the tutelage of the U.S. Agriculture Department, 
monitored the U.S. commodities/futures markets that were headquartered in Chicago.  Between 
World War II and 1970 the CEA rarely took meaningful action to change those markets.  In extreme 
cases of alleged market manipulation, they did prosecute individuals and impose speculative position 
limits, but for the most part the agency let the exchanges regulate the market, and they never 
interfered with collateral requirements. 
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By 1973, however, the boundaries between agricultural commodities/futures and finance 
were breaking down.  The CBOT, in an effort to “open new vistas for commodity marketing, by 
applying the futures trading concept in new and untried areas”5, developed option contracts on 
NYSE traded corporate shares (see MacKenzie 2006, and Millo 2003 for thorough analyses of this 
innovation).  In order to accomplish this they needed the blessing and the help of the SEC.  
Working with the SEC, however, was painstaking for the CBOT not least because of the ongoing 
skepticism of the SEC over the dangers of speculation and its status as gambling.   Eventually, the 
SEC did allow the contracts to start trading in 1973, but the new options were broadly defined 
within the realm of securities law and therefore more strictly controlled than commodities/futures.  
In particular, the securities options had high collateral requirements, and at first were only available 
as options on upward market movements, not downward movements reflecting another longtime 
SEC bias against short selling, which was associated with speculation (Stout 1999).  In other words, 
even though the SEC allowed option contracts, it remained true to its mission of keeping 
speculation to a minimum. 
Furthermore, by the early 1970s, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), which for all of 
its 50+ year history was the second exchange in Chicago, had also branched out into new products.  
Crawling out of its “agricultural market cradle” (Melamed 1996: 313), the CME used its expertise in 
contract design and promotion to convince agricultural traders to trade a new contract on foreign 
currencies beginning in May of 1972.  It was not all serendipity that the contract began trading right 
as the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system was breaking apart following U.S President 
Nixon’s decision to end U.S. dollar/gold convertibility in August of 1971.  In a fascinating story on 
its own, the CME, with the assistance of Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago Economics 
                                                 
5
 Chicago Board of Trade Annual Report, 1972, page 5 
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Department, convinced key members of the Nixon Administration and the Federal Reserve, that no 
new federal regulation was necessary for these contracts (see Melamed 1996).  At the same time, the 
CBOT was working hard to develop the first interest rate futures contract on home mortgage 
securities (GNMA or “Ginnie Mae” securities).  It seemed very possible, however, that a GNMA 
futures contract might be defined not as a commodity/future, but as a security which would have 
summoned the SEC yet again (Falloon 1998: 238-40). 
 
 
6. Redefining commodities—redefining boundaries 
 
There is a wide range of reasons why the U.S. Congress became concerned with overhauling 
federal commodities regulation in 1973.  There is not space to explain them all here, but in the face 
of new hybrid instruments that crossed the established boundaries between securities and 
commodities/futures, the existing system became incoherent and contradictory.  Not least the 
commodities/futures business was in an “explosive growth stage” (Gold 1972: 11).  This was fueled 
in part by agressive marketing campaigns by the Chicago exchanges who ran clever advertisements 
in newspapers, Commodities Magazine, and even Chicago-based Playboy (Rodengen 2008: 50) 
encouraging individual and institutional speculators to play the markets in Chicago instead of New 
York.  In 1971 the dollar value of futures contracts traded exceeded the value of all securities traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange (ibid)6.  The volume of futures contracts traded on U.S. 
exchanges went from approximately 4 million in 1960, to 14 million in 1970, to 26 million in 1973 
(see figure below).   
 
                                                 
6 Comparisons of dollar value are deceiving as futures contracts are measured by the value of the underlying 
commodities that would be traded if the contract expired, but at least 95% of the time, they are offset before 
expiration.  This explains the reference that is common today of US$600 to 700 trillion in outstanding 
derivatives contracts, which is ~10x global GDP. 
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Annual U.S. Futures Contract Trade Volume7 
 
 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Chicago 
Agricultural 
 
11,309,429 51,598,100 44,897,535 57,457,665 
Chicago 
Financial 0 18,938,402 164,562,118 328,948,402 
 
Chicago Total 11,309,429 70,536,502 209,459,653 386,406,067 
 
U.S. Total 
 
13,618,638 
 
92,096,109 
 
276,356,703 
 
503,739,629 
 
 
Growth in Chicago Futures Trading 1955-2004, Agricultural vs. Financial 
 
Yet, the federal agency with presumed jurisdiction over this highly speculative industry was 
considered by many to be inept.  The CEA was perceived to be lacking expertise, a sufficient staff 
and budget, and the will to act in the face of commodities fraud or market corners, which were still 
occasionally happening (Des Moines Register 1973).  They were accused by many of being “captured” 
                                                 
7 Raw data provided by Financial Industry Association, calculations by author.  I was only able to attain 
systematic data for 1955-2004. 
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by the Chicago commodity/futures exchanges (ibid).  This became especially problematic for the 
CEA as the rate of inflation grew, causing prices for consumer goods to rise and generally become 
volatile in the early 1970s8.  Some blamed speculation on the futures markets speculation for food 
price volatility, and many were frustrated with the CEA for not intervening. 
Moreover, some members of the commodities/futures industry favored a new regulatory 
framework to provide more robust legitimacy and an alternative to the skeptical SEC for the nascent 
financial futures markets.  Furthermore, a shadowy off-exchange industry for options controls on 
commodity futures had developed in the late 1960s and grown tremendously into the early 70s.  
Many of these were based on London-based commodity prices9.  In what became known as the 
“London Options” market, U.S. commodity brokerage firms marketed these highly speculative 
contracts to customers across the U.S.  The trouble was some of these firms used high pressure 
“boiler room” sales tactics and misrepresented the risks involved.  Some brokerage firms solicited 
orders from customers but never executed the options trades on exchanges operating as private 
bookmakers.  When the market turned against them, some firms went bankrupt having embezzled 
their customers’ money.  The similarities with 19th and early 20th Century bucketshops were stark, 
and not just because of the conspicuous fraud.  Legitimate commodities brokerage firms and the 
Chicago exchanges wanted the London options bounded off, if not shut down by the government 
because they competed for speculative dollars and gave the entire commodities/futures industry a 
bad reputation (Johnson 1976: 4).  Furthermore, the key economic function, and thus legal 
legitimation of speculative trading—efficient price making—could only be demonstrated if the 
trades were connected to the actual markets for the underlying assets.  
                                                 
8 All of this must be considered in the context of U.S. President Nixon’s imposition of price controls on 
wages and many consumer goods in August of 1971.   
9 See “Trading London commodity options”, Commodities Magazine, June 1972, ppg. 10-15; also Schneider, H. 
“Commodity Options: Ready for next major step”, Commodities Magazine, January 1978, ppg.60-61  
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Combined, these factors convinced a number of U.S. lawmakers that regulatory reform was 
needed.  The most important outcome of the legislation, signed into law on October 23, 1974, was 
that the CEA was replaced by a new agency, independent of the Agriculture Department, called the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).  In bureaucratic hierarchy, it would be structured 
like the SEC.  However, as had happened in 1922 and again in 1936, despite strong rhetoric by 
Members of Congress and others wary of speculation, as well as early calls to emulate the SEC, there 
were no radical changes to the agency’s mission from that of its predecessor.  The controversial 
commodities options would be allowed, but they could only be traded on federally licensed futures 
exchanges.  Just as it had in 1922, speculative capital would be funneled into the centralized 
exchanges where it would contribute to the price making function, or otherwise be outlawed.  The 
federal test of whether a new futures contract would be allowed became whether it provided 
hedging opportunities and/or improved “price discovery”, which mirrored the 1920 declared 
national importance of prices in and of themselves.   
On the other hand, a number of changes made to the jurisdiction of the agency were 
revolutionary in opening up opportunities for the commodities/futures business to cross the legal 
boundary into securities business.  The Chicago exchanges heavily influenced the legislative process 
and as a result successfully inserted two key rules that institutionalized speculative trading on a much 
larger set of instruments.  First, in a cunning stroke that reverberates today, the Chicagoans inserted 
a phrase in the legislation that changed the definition of a “commodity” from the 15 or so 
agricultural products enumerated in the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act, to “all other goods and 
articles…and all services, rights and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or 
in the future dealt” (Commodity Exchange Act 1974).  Immediately upon passage, anything traded 
as part of a futures contract on a contract exchange was defined as a “commodity”.  In one fell 
swoop the definitions of both commodities and futures were transformed, and made largely self-
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referential to the market itself.  Richard Sandor, a key innovator of the first interest rate futures contracts, 
and today an active champion for derivatives markets for things like carbon (see Sandor 2012), 
explained the importance of the 1974 change this way: 
The evolution of derivatives has been fast and furious, and it has redefined financial markets.  
To fully appreciate the extent of change, consider that in the early half of this century, 
commodities were defined as primary, sortable and bulk goods such as grains or precious 
metals….When a number of us were working on the act that resulted in the formation of the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, we ultimately persuaded legislators that a 
commodity ought to be defined as anything tangible or intangible for future delivery.  Finally 
on October 20, 1975, after a great deal of lobbying, the Chicago Board of Trade began 
trading in interest rates and the word commodity disappeared from the definition!  In a short 
period of 15 years, every single piece of accepted wisdom about exchange-traded markets 
was obliterated. (Quoted in Falloon 1998: 229) 
 
Despite this sudden opening into finance for futures, few of the precautions that were convention in 
the securities business were enacted.  Although the CFTC was separated from the U.S. Agriculture 
Department, the Congressional oversight of the new agency would remain with the House and 
Senate Agriculture Committees, while the SEC remained under the Congressional oversight of the 
Banking Committees, a distinction that remains today.  This isolated the legislative authority over 
the growing field of commodities/futures, which allowed the Chicagoans to concentrate their 
lobbying efforts and avoid political entanglements with the financial committees.   
Second, this definitional or boundary change was made even consequential because the 
Chicagoans also convinced Congress to grant the CFTC exclusive or “presumptive” jurisdiction 
(Johnson 1976) over all futures trading.  No other Federal agency nor any state government entity or 
law could interfere with the ongoing development of futures markets.  Among other things, no 
other agency could impose collateral limits on the commodities markets.  The CFTC only had 
authority to do this during “market emergencies”, and they never used this power.  Suddenly the 
legal boundaries limiting financial speculation established in the 1930s were under threat, and this 
was exacerbated by the market realities of futures: they could not exist without speculators, something that 
was repeatedly confirmed to me in interviews with industry experts. 
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7. Institutional inheritances at the CFTC 
 The CFTC had a challenging first few years.  The changes mandated by Congress came into 
effect in April 1975, six months after the law passed, but the commissioners were only confirmed by 
the Senate six days before the CFTC was to begin operating.  The commissioners needed to hire 136 
“high priority professional and non-professional staff”10, although some of them came from the 
defunct CEA.  Office space had to be procured, not only in Washington, D.C., but also in the 
largest field office in Chicago where the CEA was renting space from the CBOT11.  The new agency 
was also rife with infighting.  The former CEA staff, feeling that newcomers were “outsiders” 
attempting to impose new policy, fought with the new hires.  The newly hired lawyers in the general 
counsel’s office struggled for autonomy from the rest of the agency and commission (personal 
interview with Mark Powers 12-12-12).  Finally, the legislation required that the CFTC review and 
approve all operating rules and re-register the federally licensed exchanges, but this was an 
impossibly large task, so the agency decided to accept all existing rules without review. 
All of this translated into a situation where the new agency supported the status quo 
operation of the Chicago exchanges, and relied on the industry to advise them how to go about 
implementing the Congressional mandates.  For the most part the markets would continue to 
operate the way they had since the 1920s, albeit with many more product offerings, most of which 
were entangled with the financial markets, and all of them now recognized as legitimate and 
                                                 
10 House Agriculture Committee internal memo, provided to author by a member of the staff at the time—
available from author. 
11 In a personal interview with William Bagley, the first Chairman of the CFTC, he said: “The CEA's office 
was in the basement of the Board of Trade. You were trying to regulate the big boys upstairs. And it's a hot 
day, and the air conditioning isn't working, so you have to go upstairs and bug the Chicago Board of Trade 
management to please fix the lights downstairs…” 
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economically valuable as price mechanisms by the federal government regardless how dependent 
they were on highly leveraged speculative trading. 
Nevertheless, the new agency was larger than the CEA, and now being an independent 
regulator, separate from the Department of Agriculture, became more visible in Washington, D.C.  
Over the next few years the agency would struggle to establish itself, but it did become a formal 
institution with codified structures, rules, norms, and an organizational culture.  Two key 
characteristics of the CFTC help explain its relationship to speculation during these formative years. 
First, unlike the SEC that closely monitored its reputation as independent from the securities 
industry as well as elected politicians, the CFTC was from the start seen as a partner with the 
commodities markets.  The revolving door between the CFTC and the Chicago exchanges was 
extensive, with both senior level and staff level officials moving between the Chicago-based industry 
and the Washington D.C.-based regulators.  The first Chief Economist of the CFTC, Mark Powers, 
came from the CME where he had designed many of the first financial futures contracts, a move 
that Leo Melamed, a former CME chairman, called “an insurance policy to keep the CFTC on 
track” and “only the beginning of a pipeline that would deliver talent from the futures industry to 
government” (Melamed 1996: 222).  Beverly Splane, who coordinated the nomination of the first 
CFTC commissioners for the Ford White House was appointed as the first Executive Director the 
CFTC, and nine months later hired by the CME as Executive Vice President (Melamed 1996).  
There are many other examples.  This did not mean the exchanges got everything they wanted, but 
when they phoned the CFTC, they usually found a friend at the other end of the line.  Contrast this 
with the SEC-securities industry relationship where there was more of a brick wall between the two 
than a revolving door.   
The second important aspect of the relationship between the CFTC and the Chicago 
exchanges has to do with the rhetoric of expertise.  Just as the derivatives markets are today, the 
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commodities/futures markets were discursively constructed as intensely complicated and nearly 
impossible to understand for the average layperson, which included virtually all Members of 
Congress.  The dominant discourse suggested that commodities/futures markets were mainly 
employed by professional and sophisticated patrons who used the markets to hedge (or insure) their 
day to day business involving the underlying commodity.  This meant that commodities/futures 
markets were never considered “public” in the same way that securities markets were.  The CBOT 
and the CME spent a lot of time educating the CFTC12, the Congress, and the public, how their 
markets worked, what the benefits of risk management were, and how speculators were crucial to 
reproducing the market conditions necessary to lubricate the gears of commerce, which now 
included the “commerce” of finance. 
The expertise of the SEC was considered differently.  From the perspective of the 
Chicagoans, the staff of the SEC was overburdened by legalistic “red tape”, if not tainted by an 
obsession with protecting the public.  Many of my interviewees discussed the differences between 
the SEC and the CFTC.  One common thread was that the SEC was focused on customer 
protection, while the CFTC was focused on “market integrity”.  Another was that the SEC was 
generally focused on laws, while the CFTC was generally focused on economics, leaving the “laws” 
to the commodity/futures exchanges.  Susan Phillips, who earned a Ph.D. in finance in 1973 and 
worked at the SEC in the mid-1970s and was later both a commissioner and Chairwoman of the 
CFTC, described the differences between the agencies this way: 
In fact, I was the first economic fellow at the SEC…one of the things I did while I was at 
the SEC—I spent a lot of time just explaining to the lawyers how competition worked and 
how markets work. They don’t think that way.  […]   It has to do with customer protection 
                                                 
12 Mark Powers, the first Chief Economist of the CFTC, who was recruited from the CME, recalled to me 
arriving in Washington, D.C. to begin work at the CFTC and saying to himself “I decided this was a big 
mistake.”  I asked him why? “Because I knew damn well it was a huge mass of people who didn't understand 
the first thing about futures trading…” 
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on the securities side.  It’s integrity of the markets on the commodities side…It’s market 
protection, not customer protection (personal interview 9-19-12). 
 
These differences were more than a matter of bureaucratic culture. They translated into different 
market rules, and increasingly the rules that supported the virtues of the commodities/futures 
market were encroaching on the financial markets.  
 
8.  Jurisdictional conflict 
It was only months after the establishment of the CFTC when the SEC realized how far the 
CFTC might encroach on their assumed regulatory jurisdiction as a result of the new definition of 
commodity/futures.  The definitions were, as one prominent derivatives lawyer said to me, 
“politically arbitrary” (personal interview 2-26-13).  These politically constructed boundaries, 
coupled with the continued innovation of new financial futures in Chicago, translated into a serious 
concern for the SEC, who saw both an infringement on their regulatory jurisdiction, as well as 
potential threats to the stability of the securities markets. 
 The first inter-agency argument was over futures contracts on securitized mortgage securities 
issued by the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA).  The SEC argued that GNMA 
certificates were securities, and thus futures contracts on those securities were also potentially 
securities, and therefore ought to be regulated by the SEC and subject to strict limits on speculation.  
The staffs of the two agencies fought back and forth, but the statute passed by Congress in 1974 
was clear—the CFTC had exclusive jurisdiction.  The CFTC approved the contract, and it began 
trading at the CBOT in October of 1975.  The staff of the SEC was frustrated (Johnson 1976, 
Markham 1987), but the CBOT with the help of a new federal agency had constructed the first 
contract that would allow hedging and speculating on interest rates.   
Two things are remarkable about the GNMA futures contract, which even though it only 
lasted 12 years, was initially hugely successful—it traded ~20,000 contracts in 1975, ~100,000 in 
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1978, and 2.3 million in 1981, but went downhill from there (see footnote 7).  First, the people that 
designed the contract for the CBOT relied heavily on their knowledge of agricultural contracts to 
figure out how to rate, grade, categorize, and standardize mortgages.  Above all else the CBOT knew 
from experience that they would need speculators to trade the futures if they wanted the market to 
survive.  This assumption that speculators were a necessary part of the market was taken for granted 
at the CFTC, but would have been heavily scrutinized at the SEC.  Second, the success of the 
GNMA contract taught the staff of the CBOT, but also the CME how to build interest rate 
contracts.  And build them they did.  Over the next few years the CBOT constructed contracts on 
Treasury Bonds, commercial paper, and municipal bonds. 
The new interest rate contracts had an immediate effect on the U.S. economy.  Since 1970 a 
number of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) officials had been working 
to develop a futures market in mortgages because they thought it would fuel the development of a 
secondary market in mortgages, something they believed would lower the cost of borrowing and 
thus increase the availability of loans for potential home buyers (Falloon 1998, Sandor 2012).  In the 
mid-1970s the mortgage market was raising as much capital per year as the New York Stock 
Exchange was for corporations (Falloon 1998).  In other words, mortgages, which were still largely 
“fixed”, or constituted by localized credit relations between small banks and borrowers, were a 
potentially enormous capital market waiting to be liquefied or opened up to investors across the U.S. 
and the world (Gotham 2009).  The GNMA futures market helped facilitate this process by 
providing commercial home builders, mortgage banks, and anyone else in or out of the housing 
industry the opportunity to hedge or buy insurance on changing interest rates. 
The 30 year Treasury Bond (T-bond) contract, started in 1977, would become the most 
heavily traded contract the CBOT would ever construct.  The timing of interest rate contracts could 
 Page 27 of 32 
not have been better for Chicago.  In 1979 the new Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul Volker, set out 
to end inflation by cutting off the money supply.  The sudden increase and volatility in interest rates 
created an immediate demand for contracts that could hedge against rate changes.  It quickly became 
common for corporate treasurers to buy and sell T-bond futures to protect their companies’ debt 
from financial volatility.  The underlying market for T-bonds also quickly became dependent on the 
prices produced in the futures market as evidenced by a request of the primary dealer banks to the 
U.S. Treasury Department in December of 1979 to change the date of bond issuance to ensure the 
Chicago markets were open when the bonds were released for auction (Falloon 1998). 
 As the scope and reach of futures markets expanded the jurisdictional battles between the 
SEC and the CFTC only intensified.  The SEC fought quite hard in the early 1980s to regain control 
over the speculative futures activity that was clearly impacting the securities markets, but Congress, 
behind the heavy lobbying efforts of the Chicago exchanges as well as the intensifying neoliberal 
attitude of the Reagan administration, protected what had become the status quo. With only minor 
exceptions, the CFTC retained its jurisdiction over what were beginning to be called “derivatives”.  
The Chicagoans continued to develop new markets, promote speculation, and rake in profits, all the 
while leaving New York financiers scratching their heads wondering how they had missed the 
financial futures boat, and what they could do to compete with Chicago.  Eventually in the 1990s the 
New Yorkers would catch up and far outpace the Chicagoans in their development of “over-the-
counter” or off-exchange derivatives but that is a story best left for another article. 
All the while, between 1975 and 1987 the Chicago commodity/futures business was 
transformed from one almost exclusively focused on producing prices for food and raw material 
processors and producers, to one mostly focused on financial products and financial markets.  By 
the late 1980s potential financial speculators no longer found any meaningful limits on the leverage 
they could create in financial markets something the 1933/1934 Acts were designed to prevent.  
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While the margin limits in the securities markets remained around 50% of an initial purchase, they 
remained around 5-10% in the commodities/futures markets.  As a result the volumes of the new 
financial futures contracts increased at an exponential pace.  
When the innovation of financial derivatives exploded in the late 1970s and 1980s, the rules 
and boundaries around these markets were already set from legislation passed in 1975, if not 1936 or 
1922.  Regardless how much the new derivatives instruments resembled securities, or impacted 
mortgage, interest rate, or securities markets—which they did—they were pre-defined as 
commodities/futures, a legacy of their deep embeddedness in the agricultural exchange industry that 
constituted the relational geography of Chicago.  The innovations in the commodities markets for 
things such as futures on corporate bonds and futures on stock market indexes meant that capital 
flowing through these markets directly impacted the underlying securities markets, drawing Chicago 
into global financial circuits the way New York had been for a hundred years.  But none of this 
could have happened without the rules that governed speculation in these markets, something the 
Chicagoans had worked for a century to perfect. 
 
Conclusion 
There is no direct path from the 1970s to the 2008 financial crisis, but during the 1980s and 
1990s the speculative nature of Chicago style derivatives trading would transform Wall Street, in 
large part by importing the rule regime that was originally developed to produce prices for grain.  
Thus, the story of the development of speculative financial derivatives markets in the U.S. in the late 
20th Century is largely the story of constructing legalities that prioritized the production of prices and 
set boundaries to eliminate factors—including other laws and rules—that could threaten the 
continued operation of those price mechanisms.  It could be argued that the Chicago-based 
derivative exchanges, once entirely responsible to regulate themselves, “captured” the successive 
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federal agencies responsible for oversight of derivative markets.  Undoubtedly, in the 1970s the 
Chicago exchanges heavily influenced the redrawing of the legal boundaries around derivatives 
markets.  As such, they successfully broke out of their agricultural boundaries and integrated finance 
into their speculative markets.  But this is only one part of the story.  Just as important is that the 
regulatory structures for derivatives, whether controlled by the exchanges in the 19th Century or 
various government agencies throughout the 20th Century, all functioned with the same priority: to 
protect the smooth functioning of the market mechanism.  In other words, at least in this case, the 
crucial point is that regulation is not external to the market mechanism, but integral to it. 
In many if not most cases, social scientists would benefit by beginning from this 
assumption—that a market is in no meaningful way a market without rules defining its legal, 
regulatory, and spatial boundaries.  Starting with this assumption, the researcher is immediately 
forced to ask different sets of questions about the role of regulation and the state.  Most importantly 
the researcher must ask, in what ways are laws and regulations designed to make markets work; as 
opposed to limiting the way they work?  Social scientists must do a better job of framing markets, 
particularly financial markets, this way as they both participate in, and critique the ongoing efforts to 
“re-regulate” the global financial system post-2008. 
 
References 
 
Barkan, J. (2011) ”Law and the geographic analysis of economic globalization”, Progress in Human 
Geography, vol. 35, iss. 5, pp. 589-607 
 
Blandy, S. and Sibley, D. (2010) “Law, Boundaries and the Production of Space”, Social & Legal 
Studies, vol. 19, iss. 3, ppg. 275-284 
 
Boeckler, M. and Berndt, C. (2012) “Geographies of circulation and exchange III: The great crisis 
and marketization ‘after markets’” Progress in Human Geography, vol. 37, iss. 3, ppg. 424-432 
 
 Page 30 of 32 
Brenner, N., Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2010) “Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, 
modalities, pathways”, Global Networks, vol. 10, iss. 2, ppg. 182-222 
 
Carey, J.W. (1989) Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society, New York: Routledge 
 
Christophers, B. (2014a) “Geographies of finance 1: Historical geographies of the crisis-ridden 
present”, Progress in Human Geography, vol. 38, iss.3  
 
Christophers, B. (2014b) “Competition, law, and the power of (imagined) geography: market 
definition and the emergence of too-big-to-fail banking in the U.S.”, Economic Geography, vol. 90, iss. 
4: 429-450 
 
Christophers, B. (forthcoming) “The Law’s Markets: Envisioning and effecting the boundaries of 
competition”, Journal of Cultural Economy, available online 
 
Clark, G.L. (1992) “Real regulation: the administrative state”, Environment and Planning A, vol. 24, pp. 
615-627 
 
Commodity Exchange Act (1974) see: United States Code (1976), Title 7, Chapter 1, Section 2. 
 
Cronon, W. (1991) Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West, New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company 
 
Dardot, P. and Laval, C. (2013) The New Way of the World: On Neo-Liberal Society, Brooklyn: Verso 
 
DeGoede, M. (2005) Virtue, Fortune, and Faith: A Genealogy of Finance, University of Minnesota Press: 
Minneapolis 
 
Delaney, D. (2014) “Legal geography I: Constitutivities, complexities, and contingencies”, Progress in 
Human Geography, available online 
 
Des Moines Register (1973) Six article series on Commodity/Futures Regulation, February 18-23, 
variously authored by Molenhoff, C., Risser, J, Anthan, G. 
 
Fabian, A. (1999) Card Sharps and Bucket Shops: Gambling in Nineteenth-Century America, New York: 
Routledge 
 
Falloon, W.D. (1998) Market Maker: A Sesquicentennial Look at the Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago: 
Board of Trade of the City of Chicago 
 
Federal Reserve (1984) “A Review and Evaluation of Federal Margin Requirements”, A Study by the 
Staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 1984, United States 
Federal Reserve Bank 
 
Federal Trade Commission (1920) “Report on the Grain Trade”, U.S. Government Printing Office 
(in seven volumes 1920-1926).  
 
Grain Futures Act (1922) see: United States Code (1925/6), Title 7, Chapter 1 
 Page 31 of 32 
 
Gold, G. (1972) “The New Growth Industry”, Commodities Magazine, February/March 
 
Gotham, K.F. (2009) “Creating Liquidity out of Spatial Fixity: The Secondary Circuit of Capital and 
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis”, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 33, iss. 2, ppg. 
355-71 
 
Harcourt, B. (2011) The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 
 
Henderson, G. (1999) California and the Fictions of Capital, New York: Oxford University Press  
 
Hieronymus, T.A. (1977) Economics of Futures Trading: For Commercial and Personal Profit, 2nd edition, 
New York: Commodity Research Bureau 
 
Jessop, B. and Sum, N.L. (2006) Beyond the Regulation Approach: Putting Capitalist Economies in Their 
Place, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
 
Johnson, Philip F. (1976) “The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Preemption as Public 
Policy, Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 29, iss. 1, ppg. 1-43 
 
Khademian, A. (1992) The SEC and Capital Market Regulation: The Politics of Expertise, Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Konings, M. (2011) The Development of American Finance, New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
Levy, J. (2006) “Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of Commodity 
Exchange in the United States, 1875-1905”, The American Historical Review, vol. 111, iss. 2, pp. 307-
335 
 
Lurie J, 1979 The Chicago Board of Trade 1859–1905: The Dynamics of Self-Regulation (University of 
Illinois Press, Urbana, IL)  
 
MacKenzie, D. (2006) An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press 
 
MacKinnon, D. (2012) “Reinventing the State: Neoliberalism, State Transformation, and Economic 
Governance”, included in Barnes, T.J., Peck, J. and Sheppard, E., The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to 
Economic Geography, Blackwell 
 
Markham, J. (1987) The History of Commodity Future Trading and its Regulation, New York: Praeger 
 
Melamed, L., (with Tamarkin, B.) (1996) Escape to the Futures, New York: John Wiley & Sons 
 
Miller, M. (1997) Merton Miller on Derivatives, New York: Wiley 
 
Millo, Y (2003) “Where Do Financial Markets Come From? Historical sociology of Financial 
Derivatives Markets”, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh 
 
 Page 32 of 32 
Mirowski, P. (2013) Never Let a Serious Crisis Go To Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial 
Meltdown, Brooklyn: Verso 
 
Muellerleile, C. (2013) “Turning financial markets inside out: Polanyi, performativity and 
disembeddedness”, Environment and Planning A, vol. 45: 1625–1642 
 
Peck, J. (2010) Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Peck, J. (2011) “Geographies of policy: From transfer-diffusion to mobility-mutation”, Progress in 
Human Geography, vol. 35, iss. 6, pp. 773-797 
 
Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2012) “Apparitions of neoliberalism: revisiting ‘Jungle law breaks out’”, 
Area, vol. 44, iss. 2, pp. 245-249 
 
Pollard, J. and Samers, M. (2013) “Governing Islamic Finance: Territory, Agency, and the Making of 
Cosmopolitan Financial Geographies”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, vol. 103, iss. 3 
 
Riles, A. (2011) Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press 
 
Rodengen, J.L. (2008) Past, Present & Futures: Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Fort Lauderdale: Write Stuff 
Enterprises 
 
Romano, R. (1997) “The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation”, Yale Journal on 
Regulation, vol. 14 
 
Sandor, R. (2012) Good Derivatives: A Story of Financial and Environmental Innovation, Hoboken: Wiley & 
Sons 
 
Seligman, J. (2003) The Transformation of Wall Street, 3rd edition, New York: Aspen Publishers 
 
Stout, L. A. (1999) “Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market 
for OTC Derivatives”, Duke Law Journal, vol. 48, iss. 4, pp. 701-786 
 
Stout, L. A. (2011) “Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis”, Harvard Business Law 
Review, vol. 1, ppg. 1-38 
 
Tamarkin, B. (1993) The MERC: The Emergence of a Global Financial Powerhouse, New York: 
HarperCollins 
 
Thel, S. (1990) “The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act”, Stanford 
Law Review, vol. 42, iss. 2, ppg. 385-464  
 
Zaloom C, (2006) Out of the Pits: Traders and Technology from Chicago to London, University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago 
